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The economics of U.S. agricultural land tenure is often characterized by asymmetric information
between the landlord and tenant.  It is not uncommon to have absentee landlords who can observe
only levels of cost-shared inputs and output to get an indication of the tenant’s actions.  In a
recent survey, we discovered that among cotton producers in the southern high plains of Texas in
1995, there were 298 absentee landlords out of 351 observations and out of 308 observations the
average distance of the landlord’s residence from the farm was 134.71 miles ( Dasgupta, Knight,
Love and Smith).
Since land tenure contracts allocate resources and share wealth between contracting
parties, the landlord’s lack of full information can contribute towards inefficiency.  For example,
in contracts negotiated for a short time period each party usually optimize their individual payoff
after assuming rationality of the other party.  In the land tenure there are numerous such
examples.  In his investigations,  Cheung assumed single-period contracts and so did later
researchers such as Stiglitz, Newberry and Stiglitz, Braverman and Srinivasan, Braverman and
Stiglitz, etc. who approached land tenure economics from the perspective of sharing risk and
providing work incentives for the tenant under asymmetric information conditions between the2
two parties.  Only recently did researchers begin to consider the benefits of cooperation in these
contracts where both parties have a joint objective.  Itoh considers inter-tenant cooperation in
multi-tenant contracts while cooperative contracts through trigger strategies are discussed by
Kreps along with other researchers.  Since the decentralized decision making process inherent to
these contracts implies an underlying game, some game-theory literature of cooperation under
asymmetric information is also relevant.  In this context, research on long-term Principal-Agent
relations by Radner and Radner, Myerson and Maskin are important.
This article develops an efficient, long-term, sharecropping contract where it is possible
for each party to receive an equilibrium cooperative payoff almost equivalent to receiving their
full-information, cooperative payoff in each period.  Due to such payoff potential, this contract is
called efficient while contracts where payoffs are reduced due to imperfect or asymmetric
information are called inefficient.  We modify and extend the basic model of a repeated, Principal-
Agent game developed by Radner.  Our analysis differs from  Radner’s in that we model a flexible
sharecropping contract and does not include assumptions unrealistic to agricultural land tenure,
granted that Radner’s model was not driven by considerations of land tenure economics.
As seen above, for convenience we refer the landlord with the pronoun ‘she’ and the
tenant with ‘he’.  Also for convenience, we have kept our notation similar the  Radner’s,
particularly denoting the landlord with ‘P’ and tenant with ‘A,’ signifying our assumption that in
the U.S. and underlying Principal-Agent relation exist, as per  Radner’s definition, between the
landlord and tenant.
The One-Period Game
Assuming x and l (labor) are the two inputs in the production process with per unit costs of r and
w respectively, output is represented by y = y(x,l,u), where u represents the uncertain state of3
nature ( xlx xl l y >0,y >0,y <0,y <0, y is quasi-concave in x and l).  Let both parties share the cost
of x with b being the tenant’s share and let a be the tenant’s output share.  Thus the tenant’s
income is  A i =y -r x - w l ab , while the landlord’s income is  P i =(1- )y-(1- )rx ab .  We assume
that both landlord and tenant are risk-averse with positive marginal utilities, decreasing with
increase in their incomes.
In the non-cooperative game the tenant maximizes his expected utility by choosing input
levels, conditional on the landlord’s choice of  a and b.  The landlord maximizes her expected
utility subject to the tenant’s reaction functions x( , ),l( , ) ab ab .  This is represented by
x,l A A EU (i |,) Max ab and  ab ab ab ,P P EU (i |x( , ),l( , )) Max  respectively.  Assuming first and
second order conditions are satisfied for the above problem, the non-cooperative solution
functions are denoted 
** * * x , l ,, a b  and the non-cooperative payoffs are denoted 
** A , P .





* [E(U )-A ][E(U )-P ] ab Max .  This objective, known as the Nash product, gives
$ $ $ $ x,l, , ab as solution functions and 
$
$ $ $ $ A=EU | A {x,l, , } ab  and
$
$ $ $ $ P=EU | P {x,l, , } ab  as the cooperative
payoffs, assuming that the prospect space is not trivial ( Nash, Harsanyi).  Therefore, from our
assumptions we conclude that the cooperative payoff pair is  Pareto superior to the non-
cooperative payoff pair. Following Radner, we assume that cooperation is pre-declared by the
landlord, giving the tenant opportunity to cheat, according to the following objective:
lA A { x ,,} EU (i | ) Max $ $ $ ab  which gives 
** l as the solution function and 
** A geA $
 as the cheating payoff,
assuming the first and second order conditions are satisfied for the above maximization problem. 
Thus it is clear that the landlord’s corresponding payoff is 
** P leP $ .   Assuming the inequalities4
associated with the cheating payoffs are strict, the one-period game is comparable to the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game in that although non-cooperation gives a  Nash equilibrium, cooperation
fo one period does not result in an equilibrium.
The Supergame
In the supergame or infinitely repeated game, either non-cooperation, cooperation or cheating can
occur.  Our goal here is to derive conditions for a cooperative Nash equilibrium that will provide
payoffs as per full-information efficiency (i.e.,  {A,P} $$
).  We assume that both parties play review
strategies developed by Radner, with respect to their respective information sets which are
assumed to be  P,t 1 t 1t 1t - 1 1t - 1 I ={ ,..., , ,..., ,x ,...,x ,y ,...,y } aa bb  and
A,t P,t 1 t-1 1 t-1 I ={I ,l ,...,l ,u ,...,u }in period t.
The landlord’s review strategy consists of consecutive periods of cooperation followed
possibly by consecutive periods of punishment.  After cooperating for  R periods, comprising a




t y =( y )/Rgeor<y-B S $ , where  $$ $ y=E ( y( x ,l,u) )and B is an error margin).  If  R y  is at
least  $ y-B, the tenant passes the review and the next review phase begins; otherwise he fails the
review and a M-period, non-cooperative, punishment phase begins followed by another review
phase.  The tenant’s review strategy involves playing the best response to the landlord’s
cooperation and if the landlord reneges from cooperation during a review phase, the tenant
triggers non-cooperation for the remainder of the review phase and M¢ additional periods.  Here
R, M and M¢ characterize the supergame and review strategies and will be later qualified.
Let us now consider the tenant’s patterns of cheating during a review phase.  If he cheats5
T out of R periods, T can remain fixed for all  R, increase or decrease with R at varying rates or
change in any combination of the three previous modes.  To simplify matters, define  0 T (R) as the
‘upper envelope’ ofT(R) by  0 T (R)= T(R) if T(R)geT(R-1) and T(R-1), otherwise.  A tenant
cheats inconsistently if _ R >0, _RgeR ,T (R)= t 00 0 0 '  where  0 t  is a constant ( 0 T (R)=0, if the
tenant never cheats).  If the tenant does not cheat inconsistently, he is said to cheat consistently.
We now investigate the effect of consistent and inconsistent cheating on the tenant’s
likelihood of passing a review.  We define  f =  Pr[ y gey-B] R $
, where ‘Pr’ means ‘probability’. 
Holmstrom found that in repeated games of imperfect information, the degree of imperfection of
the information conveyed by a signal diminishes with the number of repetitions of the game.  In
this context, we present the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1.  If the tenant cheats inconsistently,  f increases with R.
Proof.  Let the tenant cheat in the first T periods of the R-period review phase.  Thus, the actual
number of times the tenant cheats is at most  0 T (R). Assuming, for t=1...T,
 y(x,l ,u )i i d ( y,) ,
**
t
** 2 $ _ s  Chebyshev’s inequality,









0 SS $$ $ $
.









0 SS $$ $ $$
 
[1-{ /(y-B- y ) } ] [1-{ /(R-T (R))B }]
2 ** 2 T (R) 2
0
2 0 ss $ .  Since by definition of inconsistent cheating,
00 T (R) t ( ® constant) for R large enough, f increases with R.  This is true provided 
2 RB
increases with R.  We assume that the error margin B decreases with increasing length of the6
review phase.  In fact we assume that B(R)= R , >0,  -1/ 2< <0 tt r
r
 which is implies
that
2 RB  increases with R.
Consistent with Holmstrom’s conclusions, we show in Lemma (2) that the tenant’s
likelihood of passing the review decreases with increasing  R, and asymptotically he is assured of
failing the review.
Lemma 2.  If the tenant cheats consistently, f decreases with R and asymptotically approach 0.






t 0 X = y lu T
0





t t0 X = y uT
0 (x,l, )/(R- (R)) S $ $
,









t t y =[ y lu y u
0
0 (x, , )+ (x,l, )]/ R SS $$ $  = {T (R)/R} X +{(R-T (R))/ R} X 01 0 2 .
Therefore, f = Pr[(T (R)/R)X +(R -T (R))/RX gey- B]lePr[( X gey- B)UNION( X gey- B)] 01 02 1 2 $$ $
=P r (X gey- B)+ Pr( X gey-B)- Pr( X gey-B)Pr( X gey- B) 12 1 2 $$ $ $ .  Thus it is sufficient to show
that, under consistent cheating, the right hand side of the above equation decreases with  R. 
Since, 1
** 2
0 X ( y ,/ T (R)) _ s  and  2
2
0 X (y, /{R-T (R)}) _ $ s , by Chebychev’s theorem,
Pr( X gey- B)le







Pr( X gey-B)= Pr(zge
-B





z={X -y}/{ / R-T (R)} 20 $ s _ (mean 0, variance 1).  From the definition of consistent cheating,
0 T (R) is strictly increasing _ RgeR >0 0 .  Therefore, for a B decreasing with R,  Pr( X gey- B) 1 $
decreases with R, while Pr( X gey-B) 2 $  approaches a constant ( Pr(zge0)).  Hence, f decreases
with R and approaches 0 for R large enough.7
Let us now derive the supergame payoffs for both parties.  If  t P  and t A  are respectively
the landlord’s and tenant’s payoffs in period  t, and  g and d are their discount factors, their
normalized, discounted, expected current and future utilities (NDCFU) are




t gg g S
 and




t dd d S
 respectively.  Using the strong Markov
property, from the definition of review strategies we obtain:








t-1 * R+M R dd d f d d dd df dd SS
 or





RM * R RM dd d f dd d f dd S  and similarly we
get, 





RM * RR M gg g f gg g f gg S
.
Since a rational agent will cheat only if his subsequent payoff is higher that his payoff
under cooperation, the lower bound of A(d) is obtained when the tenant never cheats.  Since the
tenant’s cheating is at the expense of the landlord, if he never cheats the corresponding payoff of
the landlord is the maximum she can get and hence is the upper bound of  P(g).  These payoffs are
$$ $ $ A( )={(1- )A+(1- ) (1- )A } / {(1- )+(1- ) (1- )}
RR M * R R M d d f dd d f dd and
$$ $ $ P( )={(1- )P+(1- ) (1- )P } / {(1- )+(1- ) (1- )}
RR M * RR M g g f gg g f gg  respectively, where




.  Since the tenant increases his payoff above 
$ A( ) d by cheating,
we define the upper bound of A( ) d  ( 0 A () d) by assuming he cheats for the first T periods.  Since8
the tenant cheats at the expense of the landlord,  0 A () d defines a lower bound ( 0 P () g) for P(g).
 Thus
0 A () d= {(1- ) A +( 1 - ) A
00 0 T (R) ** T (R) R-T (R) dd d $ +(1- ) (1- )A } / {(1- )+(1- ) (1- )}
RM * R RM f dd d f dd
and
0 P () = g {(1- )P +( 1 - ) P
00 0 T (R) ** T (R) R-T (R) gg g $ +(1- ) (1- )P }/ {(1- )+(1- ) (1- )}
RM * RR M f gg g f gg
where 










(x, , )+ (x,l, )}/ Rgey-B] SS $$ $ $
.
Let us now investigate the tenant’s incentives to cheat.  If he cheats inconsistently for
during each review phase, for R>R >0 0 , R large enough, d and g <1,
1- le{1-( /(y-B(R)-y ) )} 2 ** 2t 0 f s$ , 
R R ,0 d g ® .  Therefore, 0
tt ** A () A + ( 1 - ) A>A
00 d dd ® $$  and
0
tt ** P () P + ( 1 - ) P<P
00 g gg ® $$ , provided
R R , 0 d g ® .  If the tenant never cheats,   0 t =0
and 0 A () A d® $
 and  0 P () P g® $
.  Hence given an e>0  _ R RgeR , ee d ' and g close enough to 1
implies |A () - A | < 0de $
 and |P () - P | < 0ge $
.
Let us assume that the tenant cheats consistently for every review phase.  If his
normalized, expected payoff from a review phase is 
** A , A(d) =





  + ( 1 -) A () + A ()
M+1 f d df d d which implies  A(d) =
[(1- )/ {1-(1- ) - }] A +
M+1 ** df d fd , [(1- ) (1- )/{1-(1- ) - }]A
MM + 1 * fd d fd fd , a9
weighted average of 
** A  and 
* A .  For any f, as d (< 1) increases, the weight of 
** A
decreases and since 
** * A >A>A $ ,  __ g e , A ( ) l e A min min $ d d d d ' , that is, the tenant is better-
off never cheating than cheating consistently every review phase.  Let us now assume that
the tenant cheats consistently for only the first review phase and inconsistently thereafter. 
If  1 f is the probability of passing the first review and 2 f  is the probability thereafter, the
A( )=(1- )A +




1 2 f d d f d f dd where  2 A () dis the
tenant’s NDCFU if he cheats inconsistently for   T periods starting from the second review
phase.
2







2 A ( )=(1- )A+ (1- )A +(1- ) (1- )A +{(1- ) + }A () d dd d f dd f d f d d $
which simplifies to A( )=(a)A+(b) A +(c)A
** * d $
where
(a)={(1- ) + }(1- )/ (d) 1
M+1
1
R-T f d f d d ,





RM f d df d f d f dd  and
(c)=(1- )+{(1- ) + } (1- )/ (d) 1
M+1
1
R-T T d f d f d dd  where
(d)={1- -(1- ) (1- )} 2
R
2
RM f d f dd .  It can be shown that for any (,) 12 ff ,  as d increases
(a) increases and (c) decreases.  Therefore, from our above reasoning,
_2 _ g e2 , A ( ) l e A min min $ d d d d ' .  Hence , for d dd d ge { , 2},A( )leA Max $
min min  and the tenant
will be better-off if he does not cheat consistently in the first review phase.
Let us now investigate the landlord’s incentives of reneging from cooperation. 10
Suppose she stops cooperating in the Tth period, since her actions are transparent to the
tenant, he triggers a (R-T+ M ) ¢ punishment phase.  The landlord’s resulting NDCFU




t-1 * R-T+M P =(1- ) P+P ( ) ggg g
¢
¢ S
.  If she did not











P( ) g g , where 
* M  equals M if the tenant
fails the review and is 0 otherwise.  The landlord will not stop cooperation if  12 P < P . 
Since  t




t-1 ** R-T M * R-T+M P ge P =( 1- ) P +( 1 - ) P +P ( ) ~ g gg g g g S
and it is
sufficient to show  1 2 P < P ~
.  This simplifies to
R-T M M * R-T ** * ( - )(P( )- P )>(1- )(P -P ) gg g g g
¢
,  _T=0,...,R.  Since,  P( )ge P
* g for a
rational landlord and this inequality is only strengthened by making  T=0, we arrive to the
condition 
RMM * R ** * ( - )(P( )- P )>(1- )(P -P ) gg g g g
¢
 or
MM R ** * R * <- [ ( 1 - ) ( P - P )/{ (P( )-P )}]
¢ gg g gg .  Thus, for M such that the right hand
side of the last inequality is positive and Mg e M = { M: ¢ ¢ ¢ min Min the last inequality holds},
the landlord will be better-off cooperating.
Let us now investigate the conditions necessary for credibility of the tenant’s threat
of triggering a punishment.  Assuming that the tenant’s payoff in the period when the
landlord stops cooperating (T) is 
0 A (leA) $
, if he triggers a punishment phase, his NDCFU11





t* R - T + M + 1 A =(1- )[A +( A )]+ A( ) d dd d
¢
¢ S
.  If he did not










( A )]+ A( ) S dd d
, where 
* M  is as defined earlier.  For the tenant’s threat of
punishment to be credible, we need to show that  12 A > A .  Since, for a rational tenant
A( )ge A
* d ,  2 A  does not get any smaller if we replace 
* M  by 0.   Thus the credibility
condition is simplified to 
R-T+M +1 * R-T 0 * R-T (A( )- A )>( - )A - A+A ( )
¢ d dd d d d d , that is




(A -A )+ (A( )- A )
(A( )- A )
¢ d
d d d
d d .  Thus if the landlord’s
cheating causes the tenant to obtain a payoff inferior enough to his non-cooperative payoff
(
0* A < A ) and the landlord decides to cheat early enough in a sufficiently long review
phase, that is (R-T) is large enough such that d d d ( A - A )> (A( )-A )
*0 R - T 0
, the tenant’s
punishment will be credible for anyM¢ > 0.  If 
0 A  is close enough to 
* A  such that ,
d d d
d d
( A - A )+ (A( )-A )




,  M¢ has to be small enough for credibility of the
tenant’s threat of punishment.  If 
M= { M :>
( A - A )+ (A( )-A )








then the tenant’s threat of punishment is credible for all M¢  such that
M leM leM min max ¢ ¢ ¢ , provided  Ml e M min max ¢¢ , otherwise the cooperative equilibrium will12
not exist. 
We now investigate the credibility of the landlord’s threat of punishment.  If the
landlord did not trigger any punishment, a rational agent will always cheat.  Hence the
landlord will receive 
** P every period, which will equal to her NDCFU.  If she punishes
according to her review strategy, from our earlier analysis, for  d dd ge { , 2} Max min min , the
tenant will never cheat consistently.  If the tenant only cheats inconsistently, from our
earlier analysis, for  e>0  _ R RgeR ee ' and g close enough to 1,  |P () - P | < 0ge $
 i.e., the
upper bound of P( ) g  will be within e of  $ P.  Hence the landlord’s NDCFU, calculated
from the beginning of the punishment phase, 
(1- ) P +P = ( 1 -) P +P
t=1
M-1
t-1 * MM * M g gg g g S $$
,
for e small enough, is superior to 
** P , for g close enough to 1.  Hence, the landlord’s
threat is credible for g close enough to one.  
A further condition we impose on the tenant is restricting his ability of defaulting
the contract.  Since the landlord detects consistent cheating with almost certainty, for R
large enough (lemma(2)), the tenant can cheat throughout a review phase and default the
contract, avoiding the punishment.  We assume that the tenant faces a transaction cost of
defaulting ( A TC ) such that the following sufficiency condition for default-prevention
holds: 





* d d S
.  Thus, a rational agent will never default the contract. 
The landlord never defaults a contract because she does not have the opportunity to cheat13
and receive a higher payoff and escape punishment, since her actions are
contemporaneously transparent to the tenant, who will then exercise a prohibitively costly
punishment on her.  Thus, we assume that the landlord is better-off receivingP( ) g
through playing her review strategies than receiving her maximum one-period cheating
payoff and nothing thereafter (i.e., defaulting).
From our analysis, we can arrive at the following proposition:
Proposition.  If the conditions of credibility of the threats of punishment of each party are
satisfied and threats of one party is credible to the other, for any
ed g ee >0,_R RgeR ,, ' close enough to 1, |P( )-P|< ge $
and |A( )-A|< de $
.
Proof.  From our above analysis, the landlord will never renege from cooperation and the
tenant will never cheat consistently.  Suppose the tenant cheats inconsistently  T(R) periods
out of R, which approaches  0 t  for  Rge R0 .  The tenant’s NDCFU is









d dd SS $
  +(1- ) [
R f d  t=1
R
t-1 * M R A+A ( ) ] + A ( ) S dd df dd
where
f f s ge ={1-( / (y- B(R)- y ) )} 0
2 ** 2t 0 $ .  This simplifies to
(1- ) A + (1- )A+(1- ) (1- )A +{(1- ) + }A( )
00 0 t ** t R-t RM * R + MR dd d f dd f d f dd $
.  It can be
shown that the coefficient of 
** A decreases as d increases, coefficient of  $ A decreases as d
increases (provided d > (t /R) 0
1
R-T0 ), while the coefficient of
* A  increases with d if R >M
and so does the coefficient of A( ) d .  Since 
** * A <A<A $ by assmption, the tenant’s14
payoff decreases with increasing  d.  If the tenant did not cheat,  0 t =0,A( )=A d $
, which
will be superior to his payoff under inconsistent cheating.  Thus, for  R large enough and d
close enough to 1, the rational tenant will not cheat, and since the landlord also cooperates
during a review phase if g is close enough to 1, for any ed g ee >0,_R RgeR ,, ' close
enough to 1, |P( )-P|< ge $
and |A( )-A|< de $
.
Corollary.  Given the above proposition holds, the landlord’s best response to the tenant’s
cooperation during a review phase is not deviating from cooperation and vice versa. 
Hence, the above proposition gives a cooperative Nash equilibrium in review strategies.
Conclusion
The main conclusion from this article is that a long-term, cooperative equilibrium is
attainable in land tenure contracts by following  Radner’s review strategies.  We see that
this equilibrium is dependent upon several conditions most of which have to do with
credibility of the threats of punishment of each party and the credibility of one party’s
threat to the other party.  An important conclusion is that the landlord will never cheat or
default if the tenant’s threat is credible to her.  Hence, attaining the cooperative
equilibrium is entirely up to the tenant.  This is explained by the information asymmetry
underlying the game: the landlord’s actions are instantly observable to the tenant while the
tenant’s actions are not observable to the landlord, except through the level of input x
used and the level of output.
Another conclusion that can be drawn is that review strategies provide the landlord15
with nearly full-information about the tenant’s actions in cooperative phases, provide the
review phase is long enough.  This conclusion is evident from Lemma (1) and (2) where
the tenant is (nearly) assured of passing a review if he never cheats during the review
phase (f ®1) and consistent cheating of the tenant is detected with (near) certainty by
the landlord (f ®0), provided the cooperative game is repeated long enough (R is large
enough).  This conclusion is consistent with  Holmstrom’s findings as indicated earlier.
Avenues for future reserch exist in modifying the above game by allowing the
landlord to include relevant exogenous information in the review process (for example, the
average county level output using nearly identical technology) and/or allowing the tenant
to have some notion of the state of nature prior to applying inputs.  It would be interesting
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